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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the relevance of alternative theories of federal
budget allocation to states. We primarily intend to estimate the size and relative impor-
tance of diﬀerent institutional and political factors in determining such allocation. The
main advantage of our analysis compared to most previous studies is that we use panel
data for a relatively long time span. We ﬁnd that socio-economic characteristics are very
important explanatory variables of spending allocation to states. However, these char-
acteristics are not suﬃcient to explain the disparities in the allocation of federal monies.
Some states receive a disproportionate amount of money for reasons essentially linked
to politics and the budget allocation process. In particular we ﬁnd that the overrepre-
sentation of small states determined by the Senate and Presidential election systems has
an important impact on federal budget allocation. States whose governor has the same
political aﬃliation of the President receive more federal funds in the form of procurement
and defense spending. On the other hand, the political alignment between governor and
majority in the House and/or Senate does not aﬀect the allocation of federal funds. We do
not ﬁnd any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite we ﬁnd
that safe states tend to be rewarded. Finally, the appropriation committee membership
aﬀects the distribution of broad spending categories like total expenditure per capita and
direct payments to individuals, while senior members have a disproportionate impact on
grant allocation.
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1. Introduction
The allocation of the federal budget in the United States is a complex process involving numer-
ous institutional players. The budget process is initiated by the President sending a proposal to
Congress. The Senate and the House can both amend the initial proposal. As they share equal
legislative power, any amendment must be approved in the same form by both chambers. In
this stage congressional committees play a crucial role. The appropriation committee, in par-
ticular, is one of the most powerful bodies in the legislative process leading to the formulation
of the appropriation bill. Finally, the budget passed by congress must return to the president
for the ﬁnal approval. The president has veto power over the budget, and the presidential veto
can only be overridden by a qualiﬁed congress majority equal to two third of the congressman.
Congressional theories of the budget process emphasize the role played by congressional
actors in the allocation of the budget (Bailey and Samuel (1952), Fenno (1973), Kiewiet and
McCubbins (1988)). According to several scholars, individual representatives occupying key
position in the budget process are able to convey a disproportionate amount of money to
their districts. Hence, pork-barrelling should be a widespread phenomenon amongst committee
members, house leaders or senior representatives (Owens and Wade 1984). Other studies have
pointed out that bureaucrats more than congressmen have a discretionary power over the budget
(Gilberst and Specht, 1974; Arnold, 1981). However, no convincing evidence have been found
to support this view (Stein, 1981).
Alternative theories of federal budget allocation point out that political parties are inﬂuential
players, suggesting that party politics may have an important role (Cox and McCubbins (1986),
Dixit and Londregan(1996), Lindbeck and Weibull (1993)). Whether parties are ”strong”
institutions controlling the entire congress activity or rather ”inﬂuential” players whose control
on congress is limited by internal bargaining over conﬂicting interests, still political parties
might have an important role in the allocation of the budget ( Levitt and Snyder, (1995)).
Institutionalists point out that rules governing democratic systems are the key element to
explain policy outcomes (North, 1990). In this sense, rules deﬁning the size of districts and the
number of state representatives in the congress, may ultimately be an important determinant
of the money received by a state. Hence for example, smaller states having the same number
of senators as bigger states, may get disproportionate funds because of over-representation in
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to the inﬂuence of individual players.
Finally, although the overwhelming majority of studies has analyzed the distribution of
federal money from the donors’ perspective (central government), some scholars have pointed
o u tt h a tl o c a lrecipients, such as states and municipality, may also be responsible for the budget
allocated to them, as a relevant fraction of the budget is distributed in the form of grants that
often require an application process from the recipient (Stein, 1981).
This vast theoretical and empirical literature has devoted a formidable eﬀort to the identi-
ﬁcation of all the possible determinants of the budget allocation. Hence, what have we learnt
from the existing literature on federal budget? Congressional analysts, theorists of party pol-
itics, and institutionalists have identiﬁed the crucial factors governing the budget allocation.
However, should we make an assessment on the relative power of the President versus the
Congress in the budget allocation, or on whether committee members are more inﬂuential than
political parties, or if the internal organization of state governments is more relevant than rules
allocating state representatives in the congress, we would surprisingly realize that the existing
literature is not helpful in answering these type of questions. Although the large empirical liter-
ature has tried to estimate the predictive power of these diﬀerent theories of budget allocation,
the ﬁnding of those studies are mixed and diﬃcult to compare. In our view, this literature
suﬀers from several shortcomings. First, most studies fail to incorporate in the analysis all the
relevant institutional players. Given the complex interplay between president, congress, com-
mittees, parties and state governments, we believe that omitting some explanatory variables
in the regressions may lead to non-conclusive or misleading results. When diﬀerent explana-
tory variables are correlated, as it seems reasonable to expect in many cases, omitting relevant
players could deliver biased estimates of the impact of the ones considered.
Second, even if each single study in isolation may provide some useful insight about a
particular aspect of budget allocation, it is still diﬃcult to give the appropriate weight to
diﬀerent factors or discard alternative theories. Finally, as most works concentrate on particular
spending programs for some speciﬁc years, a meaningful comparison of diﬀerent studies is
undermined by the lack of comparable data.
In this paper we provide new evidence on the relevance of alternative theories of budget
allocation. We address two important empirical questions that in our view have not been
completely or satisfactorily answered by the existing literature. First, we want to verify whether
certain states receive disproportionate amount of money that are not purely reﬂective of their
socio-economic characteristics. Second, when this type of distortion exists, we want to estimate
3i t ss i z ea n dt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fd i ﬀerent institutional and political factors behind this
distortion. The main advantage of our analysis compared to most previous studies is that we
will use panel data for a relatively long time span. This will allow us to isolate state ﬁxed
eﬀects from our variables of interest. Most previous studies have instead considered either a
cross section dataset or a very short time span, with all the identiﬁcation problems that this
implies. The second innovation, but not least important, is that we will consider at the same
time a number of political actors and a number of diﬀerent spending aggregates. Focussing on
speciﬁc spending items often allows to isolate the impact of some speciﬁc player or institutional
arrangement on the allocative outcome. At the same time this approach does not allow us to
see the big picture: diﬀerent players can probably have an impact on diﬀerent items but for
some players (like the president) the big picture is what matters. Possible trades of inﬂuence
among players cannot be detected by focussing on speciﬁc items and speciﬁc actors. Clearly
both approaches have merit and drawbacks but we feel that there is a lack in current research
that this paper aims at ﬁlling. Hence, in this paper we ﬁrst intend to focus on relatively large
aggregates to be able to say something more about the big picture. Then, we will also focus on
some more speciﬁc spending items whenever we feel that this can add substantial insights in
our understanding of federal budget allocation. Hence, this paper contributes to the existing
empirical literature on budget allocations i nt w ow a y s .O no n eh a n d ,w ea r eb ea b l et or e p l i c a t e
previous studies with richer data and more sophisticated techniques. On the other, we test
all theories of budget allocation simultaneously to evaluate the relative importance of various
institutional players and party politics on budget allocation.
Finally, this work also relates to diﬀerent streams of political economy literature. First, it
contributes to the literature on the strategic use of budget deﬁcit by political actors (Alesina
and Tabellini, 1990;Alesina et al, 1997). Our study, focussing on the allocation of the federal
budget rather than on total budget, shows that the previous debate has neglected potentially
important sources of political distortions in the budgetary process. Second our work, providing
evidence on the importance of constitutional arrangements for budget allocation, contributes
to the new growing literature on the economic eﬀects of constitutions (Persson and Tabellini
2002; Besley and Case 2002). Therefore, our empirical ﬁndings complement the results of a
vast theoretical and empirical political economy literature showing further channels of political
inﬂuence on economic policy that deserve carefull investigation.
To brieﬂy summarize our main results, we ﬁnd that socio-economic characteristics are very
important explanatory variables of spending allocation to states. However, these characteris-
tics are not suﬃcient to explain the disparities in the allocation of federal monies. Some states
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to politics and the budget allocation process. In particular we ﬁnd that the overrepresentation
of small states determined by the Senate and Presidential election systems has an important
impact on federal budget allocation. Also, states whose governor has the same political af-
ﬁliation of the President receive more federal funds in the form of procurement and defense
spending. On the other hand, the political alignment between governor and majority in the
House and/or Senate does not aﬀect the allocation of federal funds. When we control for the
closeness of presidential race, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that marginal states receive more
funding; on the opposite we ﬁnd that safe states tend to be rewarded. Finally, we also ﬁnd that
appropriation committee membership aﬀects the distribution of broad spending categories like
total expenditure per capita and direct payments to individuals, while senior members have a
disproportionate impact on grant allocation.
2. A Survey of the empirical literature
The empirical literature on congressional theories of budget allocations is vast. Most studies
have focussed on the role of committees in the budget allocation1, ignoring the role of other
political actors, such as political parties. An exception is Owens and Wade (1984) who analyse
the eﬀect of Congress, committees and parties on the allocation of federal funds at district level
in 1978 for both total percapita spending and other disaggregated spending categories, such
as agriculture, welfare, public works and defence. They propose two measures of congressional
inﬂuence on the budget process, the General Inﬂuence Scale and the Program Inﬂuence Scales.
Both indexes measure the congressman inﬂuence on the budget on a 1-5 scale. In the general
inﬂuence scale index, the highest score is assigned to a representative belonging to the house
majority and the lowest score is assigned to an ordinary minority party member. Intermedi-
ate values are assigned depending on whether majority or minority party members belong to
a congressional committees. For the program inﬂuence scale the same logic applies, however
the highest score is assigned to a majority party member that is the chair of a committee or
subcommittee for the speciﬁc program analyzed. To capture party inﬂuence, the percentage of
democratic vote is introduced amongst the regressors2. The main result of the study, control-
1Among the numerous studies on committees see Plott (1968), Goss (1972), Ferejohn (1974), Ritt (1976),
Rundquist (1978), Strom (1975), Arnold (1978), Ray (1980), Kiel and McKinzie (1983), Wilson (1986), Rich
(1989), Anderson and Tollison (1991).
2As the Congress has been dominated for several years by large democratic majorities, supposing that parties
may inﬂuence the budget allocation, then we should observe a bias toward democratic districts.
5ling for a number of other political variables3 and socio-economic variables4, is that spending
is positively correlated with the share of democratic vote at district level, while the general
inﬂuence scale does not aﬀect total percapita spending. However, the diﬀerent categories of
spending are sensitive to the program inﬂuence scale. In other words, districts with represen-
tatives controlling the chairs of relevant committees receive disproportionately more money on
those programs. One interpretation of those results is that committee members allocate prefer-
entially money to their districts. However, an alternative theory that may as well explain those
empirical ﬁndings, is that districts with economic interests covered by some programs have
members sitting in related committees precisely because those activities are important to the
district. Therefore, the disproportion in the allocation of funds is not due to pork-barrel, but is
a consequence of state characteristics (recruitment theory). Indeed the fact that general spend-
ing is not aﬀected by committee membership, seems to suggest that the recruitment theory
could be a valid explanation for the peculiar pattern of speciﬁc programs. In any case, beyond
the speciﬁc motivations, it is important to understand whether committee members have in
fact the power to distort the allocation of spending towards their preferred destinations.
Along the same line, a more recent study by Alvarez and Saving (1997) using district level
data for the years 1989 and 1990, estimates the eﬀect of committee membership on new outlays,
project grants and formula grants5. The study considers several committees, namely ”Prestige
committees”6 and ”Constituency committees”7. Controlling for a number of political variables
and economic and demographic controls8, this study shows that the district bias is strong for
the Ways and Means committee and stronger in formulaic programs. It is somewhat surprising
that the strongest eﬀect concerns Ways and Means, since Appropriation is regarded as the
most powerful committee in the budget allocation. Concerning the other political variables,
democratic representatives seem to be able to convey more money to their districts. Given the
democratic majority in congress, this result again suggests that parties may be inﬂuential in
3The main political controls in the regression are the percentage of democratic vote, a presidential support
score, a measure of district liberalism and a measure of district competitiveness.
4The socio-economic controls are the percapita income, the percentage of rural population, the percentage
of black population and the urban/rural scale.
5Current outlays are often dictated by spending programs approved in past legislatures. Hence, the link
between current decision makers and outlays is far from obvious. The selection of new outlays is meant to
exclude spending decisions inherited from the past.
6Those include Appropriation, Budget rules, Ways and Means.
7Agriculture, armed service, interior, merchant marine, public work, science, small businness, veterans aﬀairs.
8The political controls are: party aﬃliation of representatives, percentage of voters who supported Bush in
1998, percentage of vote of the incumbent representative in 1998, seniority in congress, donations from PACs.
The socioeconomic control include: median income percentage of blue collars, percentage of farmers, percentage
of house owners percentage in urban areas, percentage of old.
6the allocation of the budget.
Few other papers have analyzed the role of political parties in budget allocation. Snyder and
Levitt (1995) is one of the few studies that explicitly focuses on the estimation of party inﬂu-
ence in the US federal budget allocation9. They use district level data for the period 1984-1990
to estimate whether district with a higher share of democratic vote received disproportion-
ately more money, given that during that period the congress was dominated by democratic
majorities. They consider the total federal assistance program and successively a number of
subdivisions according to several characteristics such as the variance over time, the fact that
the program is formula or non-formula based, the period where a program was initiated. Their
main ﬁn d i n g sa r et h a tt h es h a r eo fd e m o c r a t i cv o t e 10 aﬀects the district outlays and the eﬀect
is stronger on high variation programs, formula programs and programs initiated under period
of strong democratic control11. The regressions, including other political controls, such as party
aﬃliation of district representative and turnout12, and usual socio-economic controls13, are run
in a cross-section fashion using averages over the period 1984-1990. Also, the authors report
that regressions on the panel using district ﬁxed eﬀects do not show any signiﬁcant distortion of
the federal outlays associated to the district share of democratic vote. Their interpretation for
those results is that district representatives are not able to alter spending on speciﬁc districts
from one budget year to the other, while targeting of more broadly deﬁned constituencies over
longer period of time is more likely to happen, as it is shown by the cross-section regressions.
All those studies consider districts as the relevant beneﬁciaries of federal largesse, which in
the light of the comment by Snyder and Levitt (1995) on their panel regressions with district
ﬁxed eﬀect, may indeed not be the right administrative unit where the allocative distortion can
be actually found. Nevertheless, the vast majority of studies are done at district level with the
exception of Atlas et al. (1995) and Wright (1974) who consider States as the recipients of
outlays. In Atlas et al (1995) the main objective is to verify if small states, who are overrep-
9Some more recent literature has investigated the role of parties in the budget allocation in India (Dasgupta
et al (2001) and Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson (2000), obtaining diﬀerent results. Dutta et all (2001) ﬁnd
that indian states ruled by the same party of the central goverment receive more grants, while Dahlberg and
Johansson (2000) ﬁnd that Swedish regions where the same party of the central goverment is in power do not
receive more funds. On the other hand, Swedish regions that are ”swing” in the national elections receive more
transfers from the central goverment.
10The measure used is the average share of democratic vote computed on three presidential elections, i.e.
1976, 1980, 1984.
11Periods where both houses where controlled by the same party.
12Turnout has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on outlays.
13Median income,state population, district population, percentage over 65 old, percentage of black, percentage
of rural, state capital in district.
7resented in the Senate, and to a certain extent also in the House, receive disproportionately
large amounts of federal funds. They use biennial data on the period 1972-1990 on federal net
spending, tax burden, total percapita spending, entitlement and defence to run regressions with
ﬁxed state eﬀects over their ten periods panel. After controlling for a number of socio-economic
characteristics14 and political variables15,t h e yﬁnd that total percapita spending is biased up-
ward in overrepresented states and the eﬀect is particularly strong for overrepresentation in the
Senate measured by the number of state percapita senators.
The previous work by Wright (1974) on New Deal spending for the period 1933-1940 also
shows that the number of state electoral votes percapita has a positive eﬀect on the average
aggregate expenditure by states in the period considered. This suggests again that smaller
states may receive more funds because of overrepresentation either in the presidential race
or in the Congress. Wright also shows that the variability of presidential vote measured by
the standard deviation of the total presidential vote for the period 1896-1932, has a positive
eﬀect on spending at state level. The interpretation for this results is that money is channeled
toward ”unsafe” state in order to secure the electoral victory. On the other hand, the closeness
of the political race, measured as the absolute diﬀerence between 0.5 and the predicted level of
Democratic share in 1932, turns out not to be signiﬁcant. Overall the study by Wright seems
to show that some characteristics of the presidential race may aﬀect the pattern of state federal
outlays, and as far as we know this is the only empirical attempt to measure the presidential
inﬂuence over the budget.
3. Data and methodology
We will use data on the 48 US continental States from 1982 to 2000 (Alaska, District of
Columbia and Hawaii are excluded). Most variables are taken from the Statistical Abstract of
the United States, including the spending aggregates as well as information on socio-economic
characteristics of each state. Some political variables are also taken from the Statistical Ab-
stract, including presidential election results, turnout, and data on gubernatorial elections.
This dataset has then been complemented with information from the Oﬃcial Congressional
14The controls they use are: income percapita, percentage of rural, percentage of population in four years col-
lege and univertities, percentage of over 65 old, percentage of population on federal public assistance, percentage
of population on unemployment beneﬁts, total percapita state and local taxes, population growth, dummy for
costal states.
15The political controls are the percentage of State House delegation that is democratic and the percentage
over the age of 18 who vote.
8Directory, which has been especially useful to gather information on committee membership
and thus construct the relative variables.
We will start by analysing the impact of socio-economic variables on the allocation of federal
expenditure to the states and therefore we will estimate the following equation:
FEDEXP st = αs + βt + θ1FEDEXP st−1 + θ2Zst + ²st, (3.1)
s =1 ,...48; t =1 ,...19;
where FEDEXPst is real per-capita federal expenditure in state s at time t. As for all subse-
quent regressions, we will always include state ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. We also include
a lagged dependent variable which takes into account of the incrementalist nature of the federal
budget16. Modern national budgets are very complex and cannot be redesigned from scratch
every year. Therefore changes will tend to be concentrated in speciﬁca r e a s ,d e t e r m i n i n ga
substantial inertia in budgets from one year to the next. As we noticed, previous studies rarely
relied on panel data analysis and therefore could not consider such inertia. But even when panel
data have been used (like in Atlas et al 1995) the importance of incrementalism in explaining
the federal budget has never been recognized.
In this regression we only include socio-economic variables to see if and how much total fed-
eral expenditure to states they can explain. We will include real income per capita (PRincome),
state population (stpop), unemployment rate (unemp), percentage of citizens aged 65 or above
(aged) and percentage of citizens between 5 and 17 year old (kids). In all subsequent regressions
we will always include such covariates.
We will then augment this basic model to consider speciﬁc institutional and political eﬀects
one by one and estimate
FEDEXP st = αs + βt + θ1FEDEXP st−1 + θ2P
i
st + θ3Zst + ²st, (3.2)
s =1 ,...48; t =1 ,...19;
where Pi
st represents the particular set of variables under consideration. We will focus ﬁrst on
overrepresentation by including senators per capita (senatorsPC), house members per capita
(housePC) and presidential electoral votes per capita (elvotesPC). It is obvious that small
states are overrepresented in all such dimensions, in particular in the Senate, where the same
number of senators is given to all states independently of their size. Overrepresentation of
16A famous proponent of the incrementalist theory is Aaron Wildavsky. See for example Wildavsky (1988).
9s m a l ls t a t e si sl e s sp r o n o u n c e di nt h eH o u s ea n di n the presidential election system but it is
nevertheless present. If the budgeting system operated like a benevolent welfare maximizer
such institutional distortion should not have any impact, while we expect it to have a positive
eﬀe c to ns p e n d i n gi ns m a l ls t a t e s .
We will then consider the role of membership of the appropriation committee and the senior-
ity in such committee. Big states like California and Texas tend normally to have more than one
congressmen in the appropriation committee (normally one in Senate committee and three or
even four in the House committee) while some small states like Wyoming never had one in the
period we considered. Looking at committee members per capita (appropriationPC), middle-
sized states are normally the ones overrepresented here. But the issue goes clearly beyond size.
The reasons for having one or more members in the appropriation committee could be many:
what is important here is whether committee members pursue only the general interest or if
instead, it is possible to trace any pork-barreling by them. The reason committee members
may have s substantial power in the budget allocation has much to do with the working of
the committee system itself. Probably, and because of the complexity of the budget, committee
members have an informational advantage and not all their work can be properly scrutinized by
Congress or the President oﬃces. We also include the seniority in the committee of members of
the majority (appmajSeniority)17 as experience can probably teach how to better exploit such
informational advantages and, most importantly, will induce more authority in the committee
(for example the chair is in most cases the most senior of the majority members).
After analysing the potential distortions that derive from the functioning of congress and
its institutions we move to consider in Pi those variables that can possibly capture the impact
of party aﬃliation. In doing so the principal actor considered will often, although not always,
be the president. We ﬁrst consider the role of the closeness of presidential elections in itself
(presclose), then interacted with the number of the electoral votes per capita, and ﬁnally lim-
ited to those states where the president has won the election (winpres). In the ﬁrst two cases
we are clearly looking for the possibility that the president targets marginal constituencies in
order to gain the goodwill of their residents: given the winner-takes-it-all characteristic of the
electoral vote system, the president has clearly an incentive to target marginal constituencies
(if allocation of federal funds generates votes), which are ”cheaper” to buy. The third case
refers instead to the possibility, sometime discussed in the political science literature, that
the president rewards constituencies that show their attachment and therefore allocate more
17This is the number of year in oﬃce for the Senate committee and number of terms for the House committee.
W h e nas t a t eh a sm o r et h a no n ec o m m i t t e em e m b e rw eu s et h es e n i o r i t yo ft h em o s ts e n i o ra m o n gt h e m .
10funds where he gets higher margins. Although apparently little compatible with oﬃce-seeking
behavior, such possibility should be considered in the context of repeated interactions, where
getting a reputation for ”rewarding your people” can in fact be beneﬁcial in the next elec-
tion, possibly more than trying to buy ideologically adverse states. As a further check of this
hypothesis we also run a regression including the share of the presidential party in the last
election (presshare). Of course, as for all the regressions we carry out, there should always be
a distinction between the incentives to do something and the fact that such incentives translate
into actual distortions. In some cases the institutional framework can generate such incentives
(for example the electoral vote system) but maybe there are other institutional arrangements
that in fact do not allow each player to pursue their interest in a direct fashion. Separating
diﬀerent eﬀects is clearly a complex task and we do not claim to be always successful in this.
The distribution of federal spending could also be determined purely by ideological factors.
More conservative states could receive less because they demand less, not having a positive
attitude towards public spending. To attempt at isolating this possibility we run a regression
including the share of votes for the republican candidate at the last election (reppresshare).
Also, a possibility that has never been explored previously, is that the alignment in party
aﬃliation between central powers and state governments could play an important role, both for
ideological (the governor has preferences more in line with those of central power) and electoral
(the governor can help during national election campaigns) reasons. The central power, of
course, is not a monolitic entity and, as we have seen, the ﬁnal budget is the outcome of
complex interactions between President and Congress. For this reason we create three dummy
variables to reﬂect the political alignment of governors with the President (samePts), as well
as with majorities in respectively House (sameHts) and Senate (sameSts). We then run a
regression when Pi
st is represented by these three variables.
The regression analysis so far can provide a number of insights on the possible role played by
actors and institutions. It has, however, some important limitations: ﬁrst of all by considering
one element at time (as most of the literature so far) we are probably missing relevant correla-
tions and overestimating some eﬀects. For this reason we ﬁnally run a regression including all
the Pi
st vectors in one equation of the form







st + θ3Zst + ²st, (3.3)
s =1 ,...48; t =1 ,...19;
This should provide an overall better understanding of the various determinants of total
11federal spending in the states. The results we can get from equation (3.3) are interesting in
providing the big picture, the one that get missed when focussing on speciﬁc spending items and
speciﬁc actors. Nevertheless, disaggregation by spending categories can now provide a number
of new insights since diﬀerent programs are targeted at diﬀerent needs and are administered in
diﬀerent ways. For example the President is constitutionally responsible for national defense.
Although the defense budget goes through the normal process like any other program, it is
legitimate to think that the President has more authority and inﬂuence on defense spending
than on many other programs. In fact, the few times the President has used his veto power in
the period we consider has always been because he judged defense spending too low, and that
this would have put at risk national security.
Thus we proceed estimating a series of disaggregate equations of the form
PROGRAM
j








i + θ3Zst + ²st, (3.4)
s =1 ,...48; t =1 ,...19;
where j = direct expenditure, entitlements, defense, procurement, grants.
Finally, we will focus in more detail on the role of the president, which has been relatively
neglected by most of the past research on this topic. We can exploit one speciﬁc institutional
element to make more precise our predictions on the role of the President: the fact that he
can be reelected only once and therefore will not be running an electoral campaign during
the second mandate. Our dataset includes, along with the Bush senior administration, both
Reagan and Clinton mandates, who clearly faced term limit during their second period in oﬃce.
Thus, we should expect the electoral motivation to be weaker as compared to the ideological one
during the second term in oﬃce. There are of course a number of institutional features that can
potentially mitigate the diﬀerence between the two terms, ﬁrst of all party discipline, if any18.
We will therefore consider the programs w h e r ew ee x p e c th i g h e rp r e s i d e n t i a li n ﬂuence (direct
expenditure and procurement) as well as federal expenditure and direct expenditure and include
in the regression an interaction term between SAMEP and a term-limit dummy. A positive or
non-signiﬁcant sign would be interpreted as a prevalence of the ideological motivation, while a
negative sign would suggest that transfers to friendly governors is mainly the consequence of
18For a discussion of this point see Besley and Case (1995). Besley and Case exploit the variation in gov-
ernors’ term limits across US states to study the eﬀectiveness of elections as a discipline device for incument
administrators.
12electoral incentives.
4. Federal spending allocation: a look at the aggregate
In the ﬁrst column of Table 1 we report the OLS estimates of equation 1, where only socio-
economic factors are included together with a lagged dependent variable, state ﬁxed eﬀects and
year dummies. From the value and signiﬁcance of the lagged FEDEXP it is clear, as expected,
that there is a lot of inertia in the evolution of federal budget and therefore our incrementalist
hypothesis was substantially correct. Socio-economic variables come with expected signs and
overall good signiﬁcance levels. States with higher income per-capita receive signiﬁcantly less
as do states with larger population. Given that on the left hand side we have a per-capita
variable, a negative sign for stpop should indicate the presence of some economies of scale.
The percentage of aged population has also a positive sign, still signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Unemployment rate and percentage of kids display a negative sign although estimated with
far less precision (especially unemployment). Overall, the picture that emerges makes sense
in welfaristic terms: poorer states get more money and a number of programs (especially
entitlements) probably tend to address public funds towards states that have more need for
them.
We then move to analyse various speciﬁcations for equation 2, starting with the issue of
overrepresentation Table 1, column 2). As expected, the number of senators per capita has a
rather strong impact on the allocation of federal funds. Given that the number of senators per
state is ﬁxed and equal to two, we substantially have that smaller states will receive more money.
ElvotesPC and housePC are not signiﬁcant (housePC also displays a negative coeﬃcient)
but clearly they are correlated with senatorsPC. An F-test on the three variables comfortably
rejects the hypothesis that they are jointly not signiﬁcant, which induces us to conclude that
overrepresentation introduces a serious distortion in the allocation of federal spending.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 we report the regressions when we consider the role of appro-
priation committees membership. We consider members per capita (number of congressmen in
the two appropriation committees divided by total state population) and ﬁnd that this has a
signiﬁcant impact on funds per capita received (column 3); we ﬁnd no evidence, instead, of an
eﬀect of seniority (column 4).
In columns 5, 6 and 7 (Table 2) we analyse the role of the presidential election closeness.
A surprising result is that presclose has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on our dependent
13variable. This seems at odds with what most public choice literature would suggest about the
behavior of incumbents in trying to move marginal states to his side. This result, however, could
be misleading. The President’s incentives may depend on marginality but clearly, because of the
electoral vote system, not all the states are the same. In column 6 we control for electoral votes
per capita and introduce an interaction term between presclose and elvotesPC. The result now
is quite diﬀerent. The coeﬃcient of electoral votes per capita is positive and signiﬁcant at the
5% level (it was not so in column 2, when senatorsPC was included and presclose was absent)
while presclose is now insigniﬁcant, although still positive19. I nc o l u m n7w ei n c l u d e ,w i t h
presclose, an interaction with a dummy for states where the President won the election. Thus,
the coeﬃcient of presclose now represents the eﬀect of closeness in states where the President
was in minority in the last election, while the coeﬃcient of winpres represents how much, for
a given level of closeness, the President discriminates between friendly and unfriendly states.
Both eﬀects are not strongly signiﬁcant but deﬁnitely it appears that closeness is not considered
as a symmetrical variable: it makes a diﬀerence if the state voted for the President or not. The
coeﬃcient of winpres is indeed rather large, although not extremely precisely estimated.
Given the results obtained on closeness, it is worth checking a diﬀerent hypothesis, namely
that the President will tend to reward states that demonstrated their support in the election.
As noticed in the previous section, this hypothesis has already received some limited attention
and we believe it is rationalizable both from an ideological and an oﬃce seeking perspective.
In column 8 we include the share of votes obtained in each state by the President in the last
election (Presshare)a n dw eﬁnd a very strong and signiﬁcative eﬀect. This can somehow
deﬁnitely solve the puzzle we encountered with presidential closeness. We ﬁnd no evidence
of targeting of marginal states and ﬁnd instead clear evidence of rewards being distributed to
friendly states.
A further way to isolate ideological motivations is to recognize that republicans are gener-
ally less favorable to public spending. Therefore it is well possible that states dominated by
republicans will be less motivated to receive public funds. In some cases states need to apply
19Indicating with θp,θe and θI the coeﬃcients of , respectively,presclose, elvotesPC and the interaction term,
the coeﬃcient of presclose (calculated at the mean value of elvotesPC)i sn o wg i v e nb y
θp + θI × elvotesPC = 142.58
and its standard error is
var(θp)+( elvotesPC)2 × var(θI)+2× elvotesPC × cov(θp,θI)=9 8 .23
which gives a t-ratio equal to 1.45.
14if they wish to receive funds for some speciﬁc programs. In column 9 therefore we include the
share of presidential votes for the republican candidate (reppresshare), to try to capture how
conservative a state is. Quite surprisingly we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of reppresshare is large
and strongly signiﬁcant. This is somehow puzzling and contrasts with the previous limited
(both in quantity and quality) evidence. We will return on this point later to try to provide an
explanation using more disaggregated spending programs.
As we have seen, it is a serious possibility for federal spending to be disproportionally
allocated to friendly states, and we found something in that direction for what concerns the
President. This can be justiﬁed on a number of grounds both for oﬃce-seeking and policy
oriented central administrations. We therefore investigate further this possibility by introducing
the variables sameP, sameH, and sameS. In this case, however, we ﬁnd a very limited impact.
An F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the three variables rejects the assumption that they are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Of the three variables, sameP looks the only one that could
potentially have an impact, with a t-ratio of 1.71. Again, we will return on this point later
when more information will be available.
For the moment instead we only ask if the results we found are robust to having a more
complete speciﬁcation, where diﬀerent eﬀects are considered at the same time. What we have
done so far is to analyse the diﬀerent hypotheses one by one, like all the previous empirical
literature. Although we refer to total expenditure rather than speciﬁc programs, we also manage
to mimic most of the results that the previous empirical literature obtained with very diﬀerent
(and generally less sophisticated) methodologies. In Table 3, column 1, we pull together the
various, and not necessarily conﬂicting, hypotheses.
First of all, it worth noticing that socio-economic variables (in particular income and popu-
lation) remain substantially important and in some cases (aged and kids) improve both their
magnitude and signiﬁcance level. We include a dummy for democratic presidents (dempres),
that turn out to spend substantially more. The coeﬃcients can be interpreted in dollar terms,
which means that having a democratic president has a long run impact on federal expenditure
per capita equal to 964.6 2$p e ry e a r 20.
Coming to the various hypotheses we already discussed, all the results we obtained on
individual variables (or group of variables) are substantially conﬁrmed by this further check21
20The long run coeﬃcient takes into account the presence of a lagged dependent variable and is therefore
calculated as 337.62 × (1 − 0.65) = 964.62$, where 0.65 is the coeﬃcient of PRfedexpL1.
21In the case of the overrepresentation theory, although individually insigniﬁcant, a F-test of the three over-
representation variables is passed comfortably, with a p-value equal to 0.013.
15and therefore we will not discuss them further. We also add some new covariates in this
regression. First, electoral turnout (in presidential elections) which turns out to be insigniﬁcant.
Second, we add two new alignment variables: two dummy variables equal to one if respectively
both senators from a state (sameGOV S) or the majority of house members from a state
(sameGOV H) have the same political color of the governor from that state. Both variables
seem to have no impact on spending. Finally, we also think that considering the potential
electoral motivation at the state level could add an important element to the current picture:
thus, we include a dummy variable (gov electionyear) equal to one in gubernatorial election
years and states. This variable, too, is insigniﬁcant in this regression.
To conclude this section, we ﬁnd good support for institutional and congressional theories
of the federal budget: overrepresentation of small states is important, as it is having members
in the appropriation committee. Coming to the role of the President, substantially neglected
so far, we ﬁnd that the electoral vote system introduces relevant distortions but we do not ﬁnd
any evidence of spending being targeted to marginal states. On the contrary, states that have
supported the President with big margins tend to be rewarded. Political aﬃliation between
central and local powers and ideological motivations do not seem to explain much in aggregate
terms.
5. Pork-barrel politics on speciﬁcs p e n d i n gp r o g r a m s
In Table 3 we report the results obtained on a number of speciﬁc spending programs derived
from the Statistical Abstract. We ﬁrst distinguish between grants and direct expenditure (which
is deﬁned as total expenditure minus grants). Federal grants represent an important proportion
of the US federal budget directing money to local governments. Unlike other forms of expen-
diture involving direct payments to residents of particular states, federal grants are allocated
to states and are administered by local governments. Most grant programs are distributed by
a formula, whereby the central government decides how to allocate federal resources to local
authorities. Nevertheless, grants are in some cases under the direct responsibility of States, in
particular when they are granted in the form of block grants: States, therefore, normally enjoy
larger discretion about their usage. Does this diﬀerence induce also a diﬀerent allocation when
compared to other outlays? We ﬁnd some intriguing diﬀerences in the way grants are allocated
as compared to other programs. First and most importantly, states whose governor faces re-
election within the year receive more grants. The variable gov electionyear is not signiﬁcant
16instead in all the other cases, suggesting that grants probably play a special role for incumbent
governors. It is intuitively clear that grants can give political returns to governors: thanks to
the discretion they might have on how to spend grants it is well possible that voters associate
that form of spending with governors much more than they do for other transfers they receive.
However motivated a governor can be to obtain more grants, it remains to be asked what is
the process that leads to actual allocation: in other terms we should ask who are the actors
or institutions that drive such result. We tried to include a number of interactions in order to
isolate the relevant mechanism but could not ﬁnd anything more: disproportionate allocation
to governors in their electoral years is not driven by ideological or party aﬃliation, nor by any of
the other mechanisms we examined. In remains the possibility that governors are more active
in lobbying central powers when they are under the pressure of electoral campaigns, but we
cannot claim we tested such hypothesis.
Another important diﬀerence concerns the role of the appropriation committee. On federal
expenditure as well as on direct expenditure, committee members per capita matters. For grants
instead (and only for grants) we ﬁnd that the seniority is important rather than the number.
Again, this calls for further investigation to properly interpret such result. On socio-economic
ground there are also important diﬀerences, as income and population are less relevant and the
percentages of aged and of kids are instead signiﬁcant, with a positive sign for the aged and a
negative sign for kids. We cannot exclude that this last result is also due to political factors
rather than mere welfare considerations.
We will proceed now to analyse three categories of direct expenditure with very diﬀerent
characteristics: direct payment to individuals, defense spending and procurement spending. We
have some priors concerning for example to potential role of the president on defense or the fact
that entitlements should be less prone to manipulation as compared to other forms of spending.
Thus, from this comparison we hope to be able to better disentangle some of the issues left
open from the previous section.
F o rw h a tc o n c e r n so v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o nw eﬁnd, quite surprisingly, that direct payments to
individuals are in fact driving the result for the aggregate federal spending. All other spending
categories (including defense, procurement and grants) do not seem too sensitive to this problem
while an F-test of the three overrepresentation variables for direct payments to individuals gives
us a p-value of 0.0145. Membership of the appropriation committee does not turn out to be
relevant but, again, this variable is close to decent signiﬁcance level for direct payments to
individuals and rather far from it for other outlays. This seems to suggest that even broad
programs that involve direct payments to individuals and apparently leaving little margins for
17pork-barrel behavior, can be subject to some form of manipulation, especially by Congress.
Results are very diﬀerent for defense and procurement spending.H e r ec l e a r l yt h eP r e s i d e n t
has the upper hand. The variable sameP is signiﬁcant at 5% level for procurement and almost
so for defense while we ﬁnd no inﬂuence for sameH or sameS.T h e l o n g r u n c o e ﬃcient of
sameP is 77.78 which is not that small if we think that these are dollars per capita.
A couple of interesting remarks are in order. First, Democratic and Republican presidents
show little diﬀerence for what concerns overall defense and especially procurement spending
while Democrats seem deﬁnitely more prone to spend in direct payments to individuals. Second,
unemployment rate displays, as expected, a negative and signiﬁcant sign for spending in direct
payments to individuals but, less obviously, it has a negative and signiﬁcant sign for what
concerns defense and procurement spending. A number of interpretations are possible, including
the fact that unemployed could be less electorally responsive to pork-barrell spending. This is
especially intriguing as we control for income, which shows a negative sign: buying the votes
of poorer citizens should be cheaper, if we believe in decreasing marginal utility of income; but
this could also be compatible with purely welfaristic concerns, while this is clearly not the case
for the coeﬃcient of unemployment. Clearly, further investigation is necessary before being
able to make more precise and informed claims.
Having found that the President has some power in allocating defense and procurement
spending to friendly governors we would like to be able to say more about the speciﬁc causality
links and motivations. For this reason we include in Table 4 we include in the regressions an
interaction term between sameP and a dummy indicating a President who is in his second
mandate and therefore cannot run for re-election. We ﬁnd that this interaction has a negative
coeﬃcient and is signiﬁc a n tf o rd i r e c te x pe n d i t u r e ,d efense and procurement, while sameP (that
now captures the eﬀect for Presidents in their ﬁrst term) maintains a positive a signiﬁcant sign.
Thus, Presidents who do not face re-election pressure create less distortion to favor friendly
governors, in spite of potential party discipline pushing in the opposite direction. This induces
to think that the movement of funds is in this case (as opposed to the case of grants) driven
by the center rather than by governors’ lobbying and that the main motivation for introducing
this distortion is electoral. Thus, contrarily to what principal - agency literature would suggest,
electoral pressure can in fact induce more rather than less mis-behavior by part of incumbent
administrators under some circumstances and institutional arrangements.
186. Conclusions
The allocation of the US federal budget is a complex process that has been widely studied
by political scientists. Diﬀe r e n tt h e o r i e sh a v ee m p h a s i z e dt h er o l eo fd i ﬀerent institutional
and political players such as congress, committees and political parties, as well as the role of
institutional rules, such as district size and number of representatives. The empirical literature
has provided some evidence and support toward some of the theoretical models. However, the
empirical strategy and the quality of the data of previous works casts some doubts on the
generality of the empirical ﬁndings.
In this paper we provide new evidence on the relevance of alternative theories of budget
allocation that, diﬀerently from most previous studies, is based on the use panel data for a
relatively long time span. This allowed us to isolate state ﬁxed eﬀects from our variables of
interest. Also, in our analysis we considered at the same time a number of political actors and
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent spending aggregates. The aggregate spending categories are useful to get
insight on the big picture, as possible trades of inﬂuence among players cannot be detected
by focussing on speciﬁc items and speciﬁca c t o r s .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,m o r es p e c i ﬁc spending
items such as defence and procurement allow us to estimate more precisely the bias introduced
by some players (like the President) that is empowered by the constitution with some sort
privileged control on those items.
We ﬁnd that socio-economic characteristics are very important explanatory variables of
spending allocation to states. However, these characteristics are not suﬃcient to explain the
disparities in the allocation of federal monies. Some states receive a disproportionate amount of
money for reasons essentially linked to politics and the budget allocation process. In particular
we ﬁnd that the overrepresentation of small states determined by the Senate and Presidential
election systems has an important impact on federal budget allocation. States whose governor
has the same political aﬃliation of the President receive more federal funds in the form of pro-
curement and defense spending. However, we ﬁnd that Presidents who do not face re-election
pressure create less distortion to favor friendly governors, in spite of potential party discipline
pushing in the opposite direction. On the other hand, the political alignment between governor
and majority in the House and/or Senate does not aﬀect the allocation of federal funds. We do
not ﬁnd any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite we ﬁnd that
safe states tend to be rewarded. Finally, the appropriation committee membership aﬀects the
distribution of broad spending categories like total expenditure per capita and direct payments
to individuals, while senior members have a disproportionate impact on grant allocation. Sur-
19prisingly, our study provide evidence of substantial budgetary power of the President, a player
that has been completely neglected by the previous literature. Although the budget is approved
b yC o n g r e s s ,t h eS e n a t ea n dt h eH o u s es e e mﬁnally to be less inﬂuential than the President.
Hence, we conclude that the proposal and veto power of the President and the structure of
the budgetary process, leaves a substantial space for manoeuvre to the President and to the
Committees. Therefore, the empirical ﬁndings of our paper provide evidence on the economic
consequences of Constitutions, highlighting the budget allocation as important area of economic
inﬂuence for institutional and political actors.
20List of variables
Federal expend: real percapita federal expenditure (outlays) by state in 2000 constant US
$. Source: The statistical abstract of the US and the Bureau of Statistics.
Direct exp: real percapita direct payments to individuals (outlays) by state in 2000 constant
US $. Source: The statistical abstract of the US and the Bureau of Statistics.
Defense: real percapita defense expenditure (outlays) by state in 2000 constant US $.
Source: The statistical abstract of the US and the Bureau of Statistics.
Procurement: real percapita procurement expenditure (outlays) by state in 2000 constant
US $. Source: The statistical abstract of the US and the Bureau of Statistics.
SameP: dummy variable equal to one when the party aﬃlitiation of the president and the
governor is the same, and zero otherwise. The party aﬃliation of president and governor is
taken from The statistical abstract of the US..
SameH:dummy variable equal to one when the party aﬃlitiation of the majority of the House
and party aﬃliation of the governor is the same, and zero otherwise. The party aﬃliation of
House majority and governor is taken from The statistical abstract of the US..
SameS:dummy variable equal to one when the party aﬃlitiation of the majority of the Senate
and party aﬃliation of the governor is the same, and zero otherwise. The party aﬃliation of
Senate majority and governor is taken from The statistical abstract of the US.
Termpres: dummy variable equal to one when the president faces term-limit and zero oth-
erwise. Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
Gov electionyear: dummy variable equal to one during a governor election year and zero
otherwise. Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
Stpop: State population.Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
AppropriationPC: number of appropriation committee percapita by states. The number of
committees members is taken from the Oﬃcial Congressional Directory.
AppmajSeniority: number of terms of the most senior House appropriation committee mem-
ber and number of years of the most senior Senate appropriation committee member. Source:
Oﬃcial Congressional Directory
SenatorsPC: number of senators percapita by state. Source: The statistical abstract of the
US.
HousePC: number of House representatives percapita by state. Source: The statistical
abstract of the US.
AllignmentSG: dummy variable equal to one when the party aﬃlitiation of the governor
and the two senators from the state are the same, and zero otherwise. Source: The statistical
21abstract of the US.
SameGOV H: dummy variable equal to one when the party aﬃlitiation of the governor and
the majority in the State House are the same, and zero otherwise. Source: The statistical
abstract of the US.
ElvotesPC: number of electoral votes percapita by states. number of senators percapita by
state. Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
Presclose%: distance in percentage of vote between the winner of the presidential race and
the ﬁrst runner up. Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
Winpres: dummy variable equal to one for the state where the incumbent president has
won the elections, and zero otherwise. Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
Dempres: dummy variable equal to one when the president is democratic, and zero when
the president is republican. Source: The statistical abstract of the US.
Turnout: total percentage of vote in presidential election. Source: The statistical abstract
of the US.
PRincome: real income percapita in 2000 constant US $. Source: The statistical abstract of
the US and the Bureau of Statistics.
Aged: percentage of population over 65 years old by state. Source: The statistical abstract
of the US.
Kids: percentage of population between 5 and 17 years old by state. Source: The statistical
abstract of the US.
22Table 1:  Congressional theories of budget allocation
Dependent Variable: real percapita federal expenditure
Theories Economic Overrepresentation Committees  Seniority











LAG 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.70
(19.61)** (17.28)** (19.93)** (19.61)**
PRincome -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(2.55)* (2.87)** (2.53)* (2.40)*
unemp -1.89 0.68 -1.04 -1.93
(0.27) (0.10) (0.15) (0.27)
stpop -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
(3.76)** (4.04)** (3.97)** (3.83)**
aged 970.28 998.51 983.45 982.64
(1.67) (1.72) (1.82) (1.70)
kids -381.02 -406.72 -374.93 -369.56
(1.27) (1.32) (1.31) (1.26)
Constant 2,635.57 2,356.87 2,596.47 2,578.34
(5.73)** (7.14)** (5.69)** (5.53)**
Observations 864 858 864 861
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
note: OLS with state and year fixed effects, robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 
23Table 2: Partisan theories of budget allocation
Dependent Variable: real percapita federal expenditure
theories closeness1 closness2 closness3 incumbent ideology allignement
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

















LAG 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69
(19.68)** (18.65)** (19.39)** (19.25)** (19.45)** (19.46)**
PRincome -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(3.09)** (3.10)** (3.18)** (3.34)** (3.01)** (2.63)**
unemp -3.19 -1.93 -2.81 -2.85 -0.15 -1.60
(0.45) (0.28) (0.40) (0.41) (0.02) (0.23)
stpop -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(3.51)** (4.43)** (3.76)** (4.00)** (4.09)** (3.77)**
aged 955.91 990.99 971.30 974.31 1,004.95 957.77
(1.53) (1.48) (1.51) (1.51) (1.91) (1.62)
kids -424.96 -453.87 -459.64 -454.89 -279.44 -361.72
(1.37) (1.41) (1.41) (1.40) (0.99) (1.18)
Constant 2,821.35 2,795.95 2,922.67 2,826.81 2,425.67 2,661.04
(6.12)** (6.20)** (6.23)** (6.10)** (5.28)** (5.73)**
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
note: OLS with state and year fixed effects-robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%) 
24Table 3: All theories of Budget allocation
Dependent variable: real percapita outlays by program
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
federal exp direct exp entitlement defense procurement grants
PRdirexpL1 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.65 0.58 0.72
(16.88)** (16.56)** (5.84)** (13.84)** (11.77)** (19.71)**
sameP 26.74 25.74 -0.27 24.74 32.67 1.28
(1.40) (1.48) (0.04) (1.83) (2.11)* (0.18)
sameH 20.21 22.18 7.70 28.41 32.96 -0.59
(0.73) (0.83) (0.66) (1.46) (1.38) (0.08)
sameS -10.35 -15.93 -1.12 -5.66 -21.10 4.01
(0.47) (0.73) (0.12) (0.36) (1.05) (1.01)
gov_electionyear -5.97 -14.64 1.29 3.03 -25.22 10.24
(0.25) (0.61) (0.12) (0.19) (1.25) (2.29)*
appropriationPC 95.35 87.60 32.33 6.63 24.78 5.28
(3.03)** (2.89)** (1.76) (0.46) (1.35) (0.68)
appmajSeniority 0.35 -0.34 -0.52 0.75 0.92 0.73
(0.29) (0.29) (0.99) (0.82) (0.83) (2.19)*
senatorsPC 230.15 194.64 134.15 -8.11 125.15 50.06
(1.56) (1.38) (1.37) (0.11) (1.31) (1.20)
housePC -0.54 -5.87 33.16 -28.38 -41.72 -7.46
(0.02) (0.18) (1.59) (1.15) (1.38) (0.62)
allignmentSG -6.55 -8.15 -14.26 -3.30 -4.73 1.44
(0.31) (0.39) (1.44) (0.21) (0.25) (0.31)
sameGOV_H -6.90 -1.25 6.46 -4.06 -10.27 -4.96
(0.36) (0.07) (0.67) (0.33) (0.66) (1.09)
elvotesPC 97.08 100.31 51.38 12.27 38.31 -4.75
(1.48) (1.60) (1.21) (0.31) (0.82) (0.23)
presclose% -303.08 -328.14 108.34 -37.25 -18.86 13.63
(1.01) (1.13) (0.44) (0.21) (0.09) (0.18)
winpres 385.11 316.15 -169.99 7.11 -54.63 62.35
(1.60) (1.36) (0.84) (0.05) (0.32) (1.06)
dempres 337.62 242.85 317.17 38.64 -4.72 98.14
(6.76)** (5.27)** (1.90) (1.30) (0.14) (7.96)**
turnout 1.69 2.87 1.66 -0.21 2.07 -1.13
(0.51) (0.90) (0.83) (0.09) (0.77) (1.47)
PRincome -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(3.34)** (3.29)** (1.79) (3.49)** (2.91)** (1.67)
unemp 0.77 -1.89 11.02 -14.65 -12.23 2.58
(0.11) (0.28) (2.70)** (2.71)** (2.00)* (1.39)
stpop -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(4.06)** (3.65)** (3.57)** (2.86)** (2.29)* (1.66)
aged 1,068.79 565.61 73.67 199.70 200.92 492.60
(1.84) (1.01) (0.32) (0.80) (0.67) (7.04)**
kids -475.56 -324.36 -91.61 -160.62 -161.91 -151.56
(1.49) (1.16) (0.97) (1.04) (0.95) (2.10)*
Constant 2,326.35 2,069.13 891.97 1,149.48 834.87 273.95
(5.20)** (4.91)** (2.28)* (4.47)** (2.74)** (3.29)**
Observations 855 855 855 855 853 902
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.97
note: OLS with state and year fixed effects-robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%) 
25Table 4 : All theories with term limits
Dependent variable: real percapita outlays by program
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
federal expend direct exp defense procurement
LAG 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.58
(16.93)** (16.58)** (13.76)** (11.65)**
sameP 38.68 39.53 36.45 46.13
(1.95) (2.15)* (2.56)* (2.87)**
sameP*termpres -56.95 -65.63 -55.81 -64.00
(1.76) (2.05)* (2.32)* (2.19)*
sameH 4.58 4.17 12.99 15.41
(0.16) (0.15) (0.61) (0.62)
sameS -9.84 -15.36 -5.07 -20.54
(0.45) (0.70) (0.33) (1.03)
gov_electionyear -8.47 -17.52 0.60 -27.95
(0.35) (0.74) (0.04) (1.39)
appropriationPC 91.54 83.20 2.79 20.56
(2.95)** (2.78)** (0.19) (1.12)
appmajSeniority 0.42 -0.26 0.81 0.99
(0.35) (0.23) (0.90) (0.90)
senatorsPC 225.94 190.29 -12.73 120.24
(1.52) (1.34) (0.17) (1.23)
housePC -8.19 -14.68 -36.07 -50.46
(0.24) (0.45) (1.42) (1.63)
allignmentSG -6.61 -8.19 -3.28 -4.68
(0.31) (0.39) (0.21) (0.25)
sameGOV_H -5.83 -0.03 -2.95 -9.13
(0.30) (0.00) (0.24) (0.59)
elvotesPC 104.30 108.46 19.15 46.37
(1.57) (1.70) (0.47) (0.97)
presclose% -334.56 -364.80 -68.33 -54.28
(1.11) (1.24) (0.39) (0.25)
winpres 403.93 338.01 24.86 -34.84
(1.67) (1.44) (0.18) (0.20)
dempres 573.79 411.70 19.66 32.58
(4.27)** (4.15)** (0.35) (0.48)
turnout 1.90 3.11 0.00 2.28
(0.57) (0.97) (0.00) (0.86)
PRincome -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(3.25)** (3.18)** (3.34)** (2.75)**
unemp -0.17 -3.00 -15.73 -13.41
(0.02) (0.45) (2.91)** (2.21)*
stpop -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
(4.12)** (3.73)** (2.94)** (2.34)*
aged 1,097.13 598.85 226.98 231.74
(1.93) (1.10) (0.95) (0.81)
kids -504.01 -357.44 -188.71 -193.68
(1.61) (1.32) (1.27) (1.19)
Constant 2,293.40 2,055.23 1,227.34 955.85
(5.28)** (5.02)** (4.74)** (3.14)**
Observations 855 855 855 853
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.92
note: OLS with state and year fixed effects-robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%) 
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